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In recent years, the concept of risk governance has emerged in scholarly debates. It is the combination of elements of risk analysis with rules and institutions that set the conditions for risk analysis. By transcending disciplines, risk governance conveys important messages and guidance for policymakers. In the case of energy security, risk governance combines insights from social, economic, legal, and political sciences.

Knowledge about risk is essential. Accordingly, Andreas Klinke and Ortwin Renn describe risk governance as a “dynamic process of continuous and gradual learning and adjustment that permits a prudent and sustainable governing of risk.” (Klinke & Renn, 2019, p. 550)

Deliberation – in particular interactions beyond knowledge and policy silos – is the basis for this process. When assessing current threats to energy security, changes in oil and gas markets, the ability to regulate and protect electricity systems, and the state of the Chinese economy are vital factors for consideration. 

EU energy governance facilitates policy debates, both among member states and between the Commission and (individual) member states. The current governance structure was created to implement the Energy Union, bringing together EU energy market policies and efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from energy generation.  The Clean Energy for all Europeans package, containing several laws that institutionalise the Energy Union, was adopted in 2018 and 2019. The European Climate Law and the REPowerEU Plan required amendments, but their implementation unfolds within the same governance structure.

The governance Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 is the central legislative instrument to organise EU energy policymaking. Under Article 3, EU member states have to submit integrated National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) for periods of 10 years. In this context, they have to take into account the five dimensions of the Energy Union. Energy security is part of these dimensions.

The first period for which draft plans had to be submitted was 2021 to 2030. They were due by the end of 2018. Updated drafts had to be presented by 30 June 2023. Despite the drastically altered geopolitical situation, the Commission concludes in its EU wide assessment of the draft updated NECPs that “energy security is addressed very differently across the assessed draft plans, which hinders a comprehensive EU level analysis” and emphasises the need to use “more harmonised indicators” that were published in December 2022. Hence, this continuous review process creates a platform for deliberation and exchange about the Union’s energy security that needs to be used diligently.

Given the size of the German economy, the country’s plan to implement the energy transition should be the focus of the debate. Germany’s fiscal and industrial capacities are essential factors that will shape Europe’s energy future.

For decades, Germany’s business model was based on two premises – i.e. cheap resource imports from Russia and China’s large market for good-quality products at competitive prices. German elites seem to be unable to rethink the country’s position in the evolving international political economy. Although the then coalition government led by Olaf Scholz (SPD)  supported EU sanctions against Russia from 2022 onwards, it voted against tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles in 2024.

Furthermore, recent moves by German political and business elites point to attempts to revive the country’s outdated business model, including preparations  for a post-Ukraine war reconciliation with Russia. Prominent members of the social democratic party (SPD) as well as extreme right-wing and Leninist leftist parties eagerly participate in these activities, showing that support for pro-Russian approaches might become strong enough to erode Germany’s role in the current geostrategic contest.

In addition, Germany’s dual dependence on China regarding both imports of critical inputs for the energy transition and its market, endangers the economic health of the Union’s main economy.

Gaining competitiveness in the EV business is of strategic importance for various economic sectors  in the EU and touches upon vital security concerns. More public funds need to be made available to revitalise the EV sector in the EU. No doubt, the debate about the recommendations included in the recent Draghi report must be continued, despite the hasty and firm rejection from Berlin.

Maybe it is possible that Germany can rely on a form of transactionalism in its relations with China. However, this expectation misreads the trajectory of China’s political economy for two reasons. First, the current leadership seems to be unwilling to implement structural reforms that could help China to restart its economic development. Second, the sparse information that is available about the leadership’s thinking and potential actions in the economic realm transforms the world’s second largest economy into a huge black box. Overreliance on such a phenomenon has severe consequences for EU energy security, requiring the application of robust measures of risk governance.

Yet by adhering to outlived globalist illusions, German elites – to this day – avoid a conversation about geopolitical and geoeconomic risk. European policymakers must seize the opportunity that the deliberative setup of EU energy governance provides to start this conversation. Without including elements of risk governance, centred on Germany’s policy choices, the Energy Union will be a feeble project.