PER HöGSELIUS, RED GAS: RUSSIA AND THE ORIGINS OF EUROPEAN ENERGY DEPENDENCE, 2013.
In November 2024, more than half a century of natural gas imports of Soviet/Russian supplies to Austria came to an end. Only a few years earlier, Austria’s gas company ÖMV had concluded another long-term contract until 2040. No doubt, the gas infrastructure that facilitated the delivery of gas from Western Siberia to Central Europe should facilitate lasting political and economic relations. The pipelines were built in a joint effort involving countries that, at the time, were Cold War adversaries. Some in the West thought that initiating gas cooperation with the Soviet Union would contribute to stability in Europa, mainly because the leaders in Moscow had economic incentives to maintain a workable relationship.
Per Högselius’s well-documented account uncovers the history of the natural gas cooperation that began in the Cold War and would shape the political economy of the continent for decades.
Based on primary sources that he obtained in archives in several European countries, the author examines the history of transnational pipeline construction during the final years of the Soviet empire and the initial post-Cold War decades. The pipeline deals and the gas flows were never uncontested. However, powerful proponents and the lure of inexpensive gas imports helped to realise ambitious projects from the late 1960 until the 2010s.
Högselius presents his findings in twelve chapters. The narrative is centred on the pipeline infrastructure that not only linked economies across the Iron Curtain but also incentivised the construction of alternative supply lines. To increase security of gas supply, regions that received imports from different geographies were linked with additional pipelines, creating a Western European gas system. The states of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe, however, did not have this option. In late 1973, they even faced reduced supplies, as the Soviets were eager to fulfil their first contracts with Western clients (pp. 159–60, 166). The initial years created legacies on both sides of the Iron Curtain.
The author skilfully describes the cautious moves by Austrian and Bavarian politicians and industrialists who participated in the first negotiations. The outcome was a barter deal, trading future gas supplies for steel pipe. The book shows that changes in the global energy system significantly influenced energy security considerations in West Germany and Austria in the 1960s and 1970s. After the successful beginning of the gas relations with Western partners, one Soviet/Russian pipeline project would lead to the next. Eventually, the “infrastructured geography of gas” in Europe that emerged in the following decades could only be changed “with huge effort and at enormous cost” (p. 235).
The book presents a vital historical account. It shows how three worrying trends consistently shaped the gas relations between countries in the West and the leadership in Moscow. First, negotiations with European partners were structured by cautiously assessing political elites’ inclination towards (West-)European integration. Second, from the outset the gas trade had a negative impact on the development of transatlantic relations. Third, European leaders often proceeded costly pipeline projects in fear of Moscow. Hence, the book recounts the history of Europe’s dependence and predicament.